Critical Minerals & the Energy Transition 2026

As EVs replace petrol and diesel vehicles, critical minerals — lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and rare earth elements — are increasingly called the "new oil": essential commodities whose geographically concentrated supply creates strategic vulnerabilities comparable to crude oil dependence. In 2026, supply chains for these materials are under intense geopolitical scrutiny, investment pressure, and policy intervention globally.

For EV battery cost context, see our EV battery cost 2026. For how this affects the energy transition agenda, see our World Energy Congress 2026. For the carbon credit markets connecting minerals to climate policy, see our carbon credit glossary entry.

Critical mineral supply concentration

MineralKey useTop 3 mine producersTop refiner
LithiumAll Li-ion batteriesAustralia 47%, Chile 26%, China 15%China ~65%
CobaltNMC battery cathodesDRC 70%, Russia 5%, Australia 4%China ~75%
Nickel (Class 1)NMC batteries, EV motorsIndonesia 37%, Philippines 13%, Russia 11%China ~35–40%; Indonesia rising
ManganeseLMFP battery cathodesSouth Africa 37%, Gabon 20%, Australia 16%China ~90%
Rare earths (NdPr)Wind turbine and EV permanent magnetsChina 60%, USA 15%, Australia 8%China ~90%
CopperAll electrification; EV motors/cablesChile 28%, Peru 11%, DRC 9%Distributed; China largest single processor

China's processing dominance

Mining concentration is only one dimension of supply risk — processing concentration is often more strategically significant:

  • Australia mines the most lithium globally but sends ~80% to China for processing; China controls the conversion from spodumene ore to battery-grade lithium carbonate/hydroxide
  • DRC mines ~70% of cobalt; the majority is exported to China for refining into cobalt sulphate for battery precursor manufacture
  • China processes ~90% of global rare earth elements — including the separation chemistry that isolates individual REE from mixed ore

Western governments (US Inflation Reduction Act, EU Critical Raw Materials Act) are investing in domestic and allied-nation processing capacity, but building a refinery takes 5–10 years. For a 2030 timeline perspective, see our EV battery cost 2026 analysis.

Mineral2020 price (approx.)2022 peak2026 (approx.)Driver of change
Lithium carbonate ($/t)~$7,000~$80,000~$10,000–15,000Supply surge; demand below peak fear
Cobalt ($/t)~$33,000~$95,000~$25,000–35,000LFP battery shift reducing cobalt demand
Nickel ($/t)~$13,500~$100,000+ (short squeeze)~$15,000–18,000Indonesian supply surge; market manipulation in 2022
REE (NdPr oxide, $/kg)~$50~$150~$60–80China export policy; new Australian supply (MP Materials)

Geopolitical risks and policy responses

  • China export restrictions: China imposed export controls on gallium and germanium (2023), graphite (2023), and some REE processing materials — signalling willingness to weaponise critical mineral dominance
  • US IRA Critical Minerals: The US Inflation Reduction Act requires increasing percentages of EV battery minerals to come from US or Free Trade Agreement partners; Chinese-sourced minerals face disqualification from EV tax credits from 2025+
  • EU Critical Raw Materials Act: Sets targets for EU domestic extraction (10% of annual consumption), processing (40%), and recycling (15%) by 2030 for strategic minerals
  • Recycling as security: Battery recycling (recovering lithium, cobalt, nickel from end-of-life EV packs) is increasingly viewed as a domestic "urban mining" resource — with major investments by Umicore, Li-Cycle, and Redwood Materials
The "Friends-horing" strategy
Western governments are pursuing "friend-shoring" (or "ally-shoring") of critical mineral supply chains — preferentially sourcing from geopolitically aligned nations rather than lowest-cost suppliers. Key bilateral agreements: US–Canada Critical Minerals Partnership; EU–Canada Strategic Partnership on Raw Materials; Minerals Security Partnership (US-led, 14 nations). Australia, Chile, Canada, and Namibia are the primary targets for Western investment in lithium, copper, cobalt, and rare earth supply chains. This strategy accepts higher costs (allied-nation production is often 20–50% more expensive than Chinese-processed materials) in exchange for supply security. The COP31 climate agenda and critical minerals geopolitics are deeply intertwined — see our COP31 2026 event preview.

Frequently asked questions

What are critical minerals for the energy transition?
Critical minerals for the energy transition are materials essential for EVs, batteries, wind turbines, and solar panels whose supply is geographically concentrated. Key minerals: lithium (batteries — Australia 47%, Chile 26% of mine supply), cobalt (NMC batteries — DRC 70%), nickel (NMC — Indonesia 37%), rare earths (magnets — China 60%), and copper (all electrification — Chile 28%). China dominates refining of most categories.
Why does China dominate critical mineral refining?
China dominates processing (not just mining) due to 30+ years of strategic policy investment, integrated industrial clusters (mining → processing → battery → EV), state financing support, and historically lower regulatory costs. China refines ~65% of lithium, ~75% of cobalt, ~90% of REE globally. Even Australian-mined lithium is mostly sent to China for processing. Western catch-up requires 5–10 years to build new refining capacity.
How do critical mineral prices affect EV battery costs?
Lithium carbonate spiked to ~$80,000/t in 2022 (from $7,000 in 2020), temporarily pushing battery costs up, before collapsing to ~$10,000–15,000/t in 2024–2026 as supply expanded. The LFP battery shift (no cobalt) reduced cobalt demand and prices. Lower mineral costs are a key driver of battery pack cost falling to ~$80–120/kWh in 2026 — making EVs approaching price parity with ICE vehicles.